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A COMMENTARY ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES

A COMMENTARY ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM*

I.
THE TAX TITLE AS A LEGAL INSTITUTION

TfHE sale of land for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes
which bad been levied upon it was unknown to the common
law, which gave the revenue authorities other procedures-the
imprisonment of the taxpayer and the distraint of his chattelsfor meeting the problem of the landowner who failed in his financial obligations to the sovereign.1 Possibly the fact that the tax sale
lacks a common law background and came before the courts as a
statutory innovation was one of the causes for the cool judicial reception it received. But other and more cogent reasons have since
been put forward as furnishing explanations of the suspicion with
which tax titles are presently treated in most jurisdictions.
A recent commentary has suggested two basic causes: First, the
essentially statutory character of the tax title means that it may be
set aside upon proof of a deviation from prescribed procedure,
while the execution of these procedures-normally a complex and
technical business-is often entrusted to local officials who are
unskilled or apathetic. Perfect compliance with the statutes is thus
the exception rather than the rule. Second, the involuntary character of the sale and the common disproportion between the purchase price and the actual value of the land tend to create a judicial
2
predilection in favor of the former owner.
Whatever may be the underlying motivations for the attitude, it
is undeniably true that the legal profession has generally concluded
that titles derived through tax sales are untrustworthy. Evidence
to support the validity of this assumption is easy to assemble. A
survey made in 1950 revealed that while tax deeds had come before
the Supreme Court of Wyoming many times, in only one instance
had that tribunal held a tax title valid.3 A scholarly and penetrating discussion appearing in 1933 remarked that, "In most of the
states the entire procedure is such that it is well nigh impossible
to assure the validity of a tax deed." 4 Blackwell, whose early work
0

Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. Blackwell, Tax Titles vii (5th ed. 1899).
2. Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 93 (1948). See also Simpson and Baker, Tax Delinquency,
28 Ill. L. Rev. 147 (1933), for an excellent, though depression-oriented, discussion of this
general subject matter.

3.

Note, Limitations and Defective Tax Deeds, 4 Wyo. L. J. 271 (1950).

This is

part of a student symposium appearing in the cited issue of the Wyoming Law Journal
See also
which gives a good over-all picture of the law in a typical western jurisdiction

Note, 19 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 187 (1947).
4. Simpson and Baker, supra note 2, at 151.
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on the subject still retains a measure of utility, becomes genuinely
eloquent in discussing the weaknesses of the tax deed, referring
to "the battle-field whereon lie mangled and dead nearly all the
tax titles that have ever dared to show their faces in the court
room." - It is possible to multiply similar comments at length.,
As a general rule, the cases involving tax deeds are concerned
with drily technical points of statutory construction. The twistings
and turnings of, the law in this state will be explored in more or
less detail in the pages to follow. Yet if the cases are read with an
eye to the economic and political conditions from which they
sprang, it is possible to draw the conclusion that in other states as
well as in North Dakota most of the decisions rest upon a substratum of conflict between the landowning and landworking
groups and the essentially commercial and financially-minded interests in the community.7 In its most tangible form, this sometimes
expresses itself in recurring efforts by state legislatures to bolster
the vulnerable status of tax titles and by equally persistent efforts
on the part of the courts to free themselves from the hampering
effect of legislation they consider unduly restrictive., The courts
have usually had the last say in the matter, and since it is possible
for them to effectively cushion the impact of legislative enactments by techniques of construction, the legal standing of the tax
deed has steadily deteriorated.
In times of prosperity, this conflict becomes much less marked.
Even in times of economic stress little reference to it appears in
the opinions. But on occasion the judges have spoken emphatically
on the point, as witness the language employed in one North Dakota decision by a judge who was concurring in a decision setting
aside a tax sale:
5. Blackwell, Tax Titles iii (5th ed. 1899).
6. E.g., "No document of purported legal dignity has been treated more ignominiously
by the legal profession than the tax sale deed," Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 93 (1948);
"Tax titles in Mississippi do not have such legal force and effect as to bring more than
taxes, damages, costs, etc., or a nominal consideration at a tax sale," Clark, Tax Titles in
Mississippi, 17 Miss. L. J. 372, 373 (1946); "A collector of rare specimens of legal
documents, searching in this jurisdiction for a valid tax deed, will need to take diligent
injuiry,"' Eagan v. Mahoney, 24 Colo. App. 285, 175 Pac. 1119 (1913), quoted in
Note, 18 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 393 (1946); "There was a time when the conveyance of
lands to a tax purchaser came as near being a solemn mockery as it was possible for
any transaction wearing the sanction of legal forms," Black, Tax Titles iii (1888); "The
prospective taxpayer and his property are encased in a multitude of safeguards and
restrictions to such an extent that the avoidance of paying taxes has become an art,"
Fairchild, Tax Titles in New York State, 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 61, 67 (1938).
7. Such conflicts of interest normally provide the background for the development of
the law. See 1 Powell, Real Property 47-48 (1949); Holmes, The Common Law
1 (1881).
8. The discussion in Clark, Tax Titles in Mississippi, 17 Miss. L. J. 372 (1946),
contains a detailed history of such a situation. In all fairness, it should be said that
much of the legislation intended to bolster tax titles has had its origin in other considerations,
among them the necessity of protecting the public revenue.

A COMMENTARY ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES

When a party attempts to purchase land at a tax sale and to
get interest at the rate of 24 per cent, with a penalty of 5 per
cent, he has no reason to complain if he gets back only his
principal with six per cent interest. Shylock did not far so well
when he insisted on the pound of flesh.9
The interest rates cited were correct at the time of the opinion
and indicate graphically one of the basic reasons for the tax title's
lack of stability.
Viewed from the standpoint of history, the critical attitude of
the courts toward tax deeds-as well as the corollary result that
tax titles are undependable-finds many parallels. When courts
become convinced that a particular legal institution possesses undesirable aspects, strange things happen to it. One of the factors
contributing to the development of many modern principles of
land law was the distaste of the English judiciary for the feudal
institutions which permitted the land of England to be indefinitely
tied up in the bands of a few families. 10 Such familiar doctrines of
the law of property as the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1 and the rule
against restraints on alienation,2 owe their existence to this situation. A recent study has even remarked upon its influence in the
development of the law of dower. 13 Since the judicial process seems
to be essentially unchangeable, it should occasion little surprise to
discover factors of a similar character at work remolding the law
of tax deeds.
The widespread attitude of criticism on the part of the courts
as they have viewed the operation of tax sales suggests, however,
more than a mere historical parallel. There has accumulated a considerable body of evidence indicating that the present method of
collecting real estate taxes which become delinquent has economically undesirable consequences. It has been pointed out that a
cyclical effect occurs: "Tax titles are upset because the price paid
is confiscatory, and the price paid is confiscatory because tax titles
are notoriously liable to be upset." 14 In North Dakota the cycle is
reinforced by statute, since the methods of bidding used at tax sales
9.* Mr. Justice Robinson, concurring in Davidson v. Kepner, 37 N.D. 198, 203, 163
N.W. 831,

832 (1917).

Similarly vigorous language may be found in

Land Co. v. Harris, 42 N.D. 76, 172 N.W. 68 (1919).
3 N.D. 502, 57 N.W. 789
were sold for a total of $96.

10.

(1894),

in

which 1,700 acres

Red River Valley

And see Power v. Larahee,
of land worth

$4 per

acre

2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 0310; Haskins, The Development

of Common Law Dower, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 42, 47-48 (1948).

11.

Gray, Perpetuities §263 (3d ed. 1915).

"In truth, the rule seems not to allow nor call for any reason except public
12.
policy." Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property §21 (2d ed. 1895). See also 4
Holdsworth, History of English Law 473-74 (1924).

13.

Haskins, supra note 10, at 47-48.

14.

Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 93, 100 (1948).

See also Simpson and

Baker, Tax

Delinquency, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 147, 152-53 (1933), for a discussion of similar factors.
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effectively keep the price at a minimum-a topic discussed subsequently. But in addition to the circular reaction described above,
other effects take place.
Thus, during periods of economic distress tax delinquent land has
a tendency to accumulate in the hands of the taxing authorities,
and the absence of this land from the tax rolls necessarily tends
to make the process of tax adjustment more difficult.15 Further,
during periods of depression tax sales have a deflationary effect
upon the economy precisely when it is not wanted. During the
period of deflation which began in 1929,16 vast areas of land in
states bordering North Dakota were offered for public sale in this
manner at the lowest possible price in any already depressed market, thereby effectively reducing the prices obtainable for property remaining in private hands.17
North Dakota met the dilemma of the tax sale by simply suspending their effect during the depression years.18 Statutes were
enacted which extended the period of redemption from tax sales
or in other ways attempted to lessen the burden resting upon landowners who were unable to meet their tax liabilities.'9 In short,
when an economic emergency occurred, the methods of collecting
revenue from the taxation of real property which were in use in this
state proved inadequate to deal with the situation.
Nor is this the only unfortunate result of the present laws respecting tax sales. Faced with the repeated necessity of protecting
landowners from the loss of their land through no real fault of their
own, the courts in this state as in others repeatedly construed the
statutes in the most technical manner possible. Around the taxpayer they threw the protection of the rule that statutes designed
15.

Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 93, 100 (1948).

16.
So far as North Dakota was concerned, it began before that. In 1933 the
North Dakota legislature enacted a measure extending the period of redemption for persons
who had lost title to land through tax sales, on the ground, among others, that "a public
emergency and crisis exists throughout this state endangering the public health, welfare

and morals, in that agricultural crops and products have been sold on an average below
the cost of production since 1922..." N.D. Sess. Laws 1933, c. 253.

17.
Simpson and Baker, supra note 14, at 149-50. It was estimated that in the five
states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota and Oregon, 40,000,000 acres
of land were tax delinquent.
18.
"It is a matter of common knowledge that a severe depression existed in North
Dakota during the period from 1930 to 1940. The conditions as to crops and prices
prevailing made the cash resources of people very small.
Very many citizens were
unable to pay their taxes. The local and state governments were in difficulties for lack
of tax receipts sufficient to carry on the processes of government. A real emergency faced
the people and the government. This gave rise to the attempts of the legislatures meeting
during that time to ameliorate those tax problems as far as possible. The five sessions
of the legislature meeting in that decade passed 91 acts on tax matters."
Coulter v.

Ramberg, 55 N.W.2d 516, 519 (N.D. 1952).
19. Surveys of this legislation appear in Coulter v. Ramberg, 55 N.W.2d
(N.D. 1952); Kelsch v. Miller, 73 N.D. 405, 15 N.W.2d 433 (1944).
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for his protection were to be rigidly enforced,20 while at the same
time confronting the purchaser at the tax sale with the warning
implicit in the maxim caveat emptor.2' However, these decisions
created rules of property which laid the groundwork for future
difficulties. And thus when the value of land swung spectacularly
upward in the western portions of the state following the discovery
of oil, landowners who had purchased land which contained a tax
sale in the chain of title found themeselves deprived of the clear
and unclouded ownership which was and is the prerequisite to successful development of property. It was, at one time, a genuinely
beneficial thing that a sale of land for delinquent taxes should
amount to little more than an assignment of tax money coupled
with a dubious lien. It can scarcely be so considered at present,
but the process of bolstering tax titles is hampered by the fact that
overruling a precedent in this field results in a retroactive and
therefore presumptively unfair shifting of rights of property. Nor
does it seem possible to reach the same results by retroactive legislation, which is subject not only to the objections which are valid
with respect to overruling the prior cases but also the limitations
inherent in the concept of due process of law and constitutional
22
provisions against impairment of the obligations of contract.
It would be interesting to compare the status of tax foreclosures
in this state with the results which have been obtained in others
where effective reforms have been instituted. But such a discussion
would deal with the law of tax deeds as it ought to be, rather than
as it is. Accordingly, further commentary will be confined to an
evaluation of the present law of this state.
II.
PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN ISSUANCE OF TAX DEEDS

Since an understanding of the basic steps which lead up to the
issuance of a tax deed is necessary to a thorough grasp of the
legal problems which may develop, it seems worthwhile to outline
in simplified fashion the steps leading up to the acquisition of a
tax title in the order in which they normally occur.
20. "It is well established that the law governing the issuance of tax deeds must
be strictly construed. This is based on the principle that where property is sold for taxes
in a summary manner without any regular proceedings in a court of justice it is
essential that all the requirements of law should be strictly complied with." Zuger, Tax
Titles, North Dakota State Bar Association Section Program for 1949, pp. 48-49.
21. Tyler v. Cass County, 1 N.D. 369, 48 N.W. 232 (1890); Budge v. Grand
Forks, 1 N.D. 309, 47 N.W. 390 (1890).
2. The topic of curative and retroactive legislation is discussed in the second
portion of this paper, which will appear in the October, 1953, issue of the NORTH
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
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A simple case may be assumed. John Doe purchases a tract of
land lying in a typical North Dakota county, giving to his grantor,
Richard Roe, a purchase money mortgage for the unpaid balance
of the price. He thus acquires an estate in fee simple absolute,
encumbered only by the lien of the mortgage he has given to his
grantor. The land does not constitute homestead property.
For the purpose of this discussion, it may be assumed that John
Doe is a normal and ordinary citizen. He is distinguished from his
fellows in only one aspect of his existence: he possesses an inherent
and uncontrollable aversion to the payment of real estate .taxes in
any manner or form. It is possible, therefore, to follow his path as
he proceeds along the chain of events which leads to his loss of the
land through the issuance of a tax deed to his property.
If John Doe purchased his property in an odd-numbered year,
he will receive on or about April I of that year a visit from the
county assessor. This is because the statutes provide that, "All real
property subject to taxation shall be listed and assessed every oddnumbered year with reference to its value, on April first of that
year .. ,,23 The process of assessment, from a legal point of view,
consists of four different steps: (1) the property must be listed in
the assessment book furnished to the assessor by the county for that
purpose, the description of the land being set down opposite the
owner's name; 24 (2) the assessor must view the land and reach a
conclusion as to its value; 25 (3) the assessor must then write out
opposite the description the description of the tract of land the
value of the property as he has determined it; 26 and (4) he must
27
then return the book to the county clerk and auditor.
Is the valuation thus placed on the property conclusive, or is Doe
entitled to question it? The answer is that he is entitled to make a
contest, should he choose to do so, before the proper administrative
authority-in this case the board of equalization.28 However, in
the event that the decision of that body is adverse Doe will experience great difficulty in attempting to get relief from a valuation he
considers too high in the courts, since the North Dakota Supreme
Court has ruled that the task of assessment is quasi-judicial in
nature and that errors in judgment on the part of the assessor do
23. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0211 (1) (1943).
24. Id. §57 0231.
25. Id. §57-0227.
26. Id. §57-0234.
27. The procedure outlined above is derived from that summarized in Power v.
Larabee, 2 N.D. 141, 49 N.W. 724, 726 (1891), and is discussed at greater length under
the heading of "Assessment," infra pp. 252-259.
28. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0904 (1943).
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not take him beyond the exclusive jurisdiction to make such valuations vested in him by the statutes.29 For the purposes of the immediate discussion it is unnecessary to develop this aspect of the procedure at length. 3° Whatever Doe's feelings with respect to the
assessment may be,3 1 the fact that he has purchased the land only
recently will make it possible, if a protest is made, for the revenue
authorities to present highly persuasive evidence of the market
32
value of the property.
In the meantime, another portion of the taxing operation has
been under way. The board of County Commissioners will have
been considering the question of how much money will be needed
to carry on the functions of the county for the ensuing year, and
the county budget has been in the process of preparation. A similar
task has engaged the attention of the State Board of Equalization,
and the rate of the state tax has been certified to the county auditor. 33 The same procedure may have been followed with respect to
Doe's property by a number of official bodies: cities, villages, town34
ships, school and park districts, and the like.
On the fourth Tuesday in July, the County Commissioners make
their own levy on taxes 3-"and the amount of taxes which Doe's
individual tract must bear is now ascertainable through a simple
process of computation, discussed infra.36 The tax list is made out
3
by the county auditor 37 and transmitted to the county treasurer,
who is thenceforth responsible for the collection of the tax. 39 All
of the statutory processes involved-which have been, it is repeated,
simplified in their treatment here-culminate in the receipt by
John Doe of a statement of taxes due upon his property.
At this point, John Doe deviates from the norm. He decides not
to pay, or, in the normal situation, is unable to do so. All taxes upon
real and personal property are due on the first day of January following the year in which they were levied, but Doe will not be
considered in default until the following March first.4"
If the default continues, the county treasurer will mail to Doe
29. Shuttuck v. Smith, 6 N.D. 56, 69 N.W. 5 (1896).
30 See, "Equalization of Assessments," infra pp. 260-261.
31. Mr. Justice Holmes' secretary once exclaimed to him, "Don't you hate to pay
taxes!" Holmes responded, "No, young feller. I like to pay taxes; with them I buy
civilization." Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 42 (1938).
32. See notes 96 and 97, infra.
33. N.D. Rev. Code §57-1504 (1943).
34. Id. §57-1532.
35. Id. §57-1505.
See "Levy of Taxes," infra pp. 262-264.
57. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2002 (1943).
38. Id. §57-2006.
39. Id. §57-2007.
40. Id. §57-2001.
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between November 1 and November 15 a notice to the effect that
unless the taxes plus the accrued penalties are paid before the
41
second Tuesday in December the land will be sold for taxes.
Since the land involved is a tract in which two separate interests
have been hypostatized, a further question is presented. Must
service of this notice of tax sale be made upon the mortgagee, Richard Roe, in order to cut off his interest? While the statute does not
say so, it seems safe to conclude that the mortgagee ought to receive notice if his mortgage is of record.42 This is a matter explained
43
at greater length in the subsequent discussion.
At the same time that the county treasurer is engaged in mailing
out notices of tax sale, the county treasurer is required to prepare
a list of all delinquent real estate taxes and post one copy of it in
his office. Four other copies must be posted at "conspicuous public
places, such as banks, public halls, or post offices, in different parts
of the county." 44 In addition, at least fourteen days before the sale
the auditor will give notice by publishing in the official newspaper
a notice that a tax sale will be held and that a list of the land subject to tax sale may be examined in his office.41 The posting of these
notices and proof of the publication of the notice of tax sale is required to be attested to by affidavits filed in the county auditor's
6
office.4
Thereafter, on the second Tuesday in December, the county auditor will commence the tax sale, either in his office or in the court
room. 4 The land is offered for sale in the order in which various
parcels appear in the list of tax delinquent property. The auditor
is required to announce, before any, parcel is offered, the total
amount of taxes, penalties and costs against it.4 8
One would normally assume, since the sale is referred to in the
statutes as a public auction, that the person who made the highest
41.
"Between the first day and fifteenth day of November in each year, the
county treasurer shall mail to each owner of any lot or tract of land subject to sale

at the delinquent tax sale provided for in this chapter, a notice giving the legal description
of such lot or tract to be offered for sale, and stating that such lot or tract will be sold
for delinquent taxes unless such delinquent tax, with penalty, interest, and cost of
advertising is paid prior to the sale on the second Tuesday in December following." N.D.
Rev. Code §57-2401 (1943).
42. The statute set forth in note 41, supra, provides that the notice shall be
mailed to "each owner" of land subject to tax sale. The word "owner" is not susceptible
of precise definition. The preferred treatment of it is to say that any person possessing
an interest in land is the "owner" of that interest. Thus, a person holding a mortgage
on land is an "owner" of the land within the sounder interpretation of the statute. Adams
v. Beale, 19 Iowa 61 (1865).
43. See "The Right of Redemption," Part II of this paper, which will appear in
the October, 1953, issue.
44. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2402 (1943).
45. Id. §57-2407.
46. Id. §§57-2406, 57-2408.
47. Id. §57-2412.
48. Ibid.
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bid for the property would be entitled to it, but such is not the case.
Instead, the successful bidder is the person who will (a) bid the
total amount of taxes, penalties and costs as announced by the
auditor, and (b) offer to accept the lowest rate of interest on the
foregoing amount, in no case to exceed six per cent, in the event
the owner of the land should choose to redeem from the tax sale.49
To explain this situation in another manner, assume that A and B
both desire to purchase a given tract offered at the sale. If the total
amount of taxes, penalties and costs announced by the auditor
totals $100, A can commence the bidding by offering to pay the
$100 and to accept six per cent interest on this amount in the event
the owner of the land chooses to redeem. B, in his turn, can override A's bid by offering to accept five per cent interest from the
owner of the land in the event of redemption. A, of course, has
the option to counter with an offer to accept four per cent. There
is left to the bemused contemplation of the reader the question
of the rights of the parties where both bid the "maximum" by agreeing to accept no interest whatever! The statutes make no provision
for this situation, and no cases dealing with it have been unearthed.
What happens if the sale produces a dearth of bidders and no one
enters an offer for the land? In that event, the land is offered once
again before the sale closes and the county treasurer, if there is no
bid on the second offering, will buy the land for the county.50
The procedure varies from this point on, depending upon whether
the land was purchased by a private citizen or the county. In the
event a private purchaser has entered a bid for the land, the county
auditor issues to him a "County Certificate of Sale For Taxes" 51
containing (a) the description of the land, (b) the date of the sale,
(c) the amount of taxes, penalties and costs for which the land
was sold, (d) the rate of interest which the purchaser agreed to
accept from the landowner in the event of redemption, and (e)
the date on which the purchaser will be entitled to a tax deed in
the event that John Doe does not make redemption.12
Does this mean that the purchaser is now entitled to enter into
possession of the land? Definitely not. Doe will be entitled to hold
the land until the time for redemption of the property has expired
and the right of redemption has been legally terminated-which will
take a minimum of something more than three and a quarter
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. §57-2414.
Id. §§57-2419, 57-2420.
Id. §57-2420.
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years.53 During this period, the property will continue to be assessed annually for taxes. In the event that the purchaser pays
them, he is entitled to the issuance of a "Subsequent Tax Sale Cer54
tificate" which has all the force and effect of a new sale.
When the time for redemption expires, the purchaser normally
presents the tax sale certificate to the county auditor, who then
prepares a document entitled "Notice of the Expiration of the
Period of Redemption." -5 This is served upon Doe. 6 It is also
served upon Roe, the holder of the mortgage, if-but only if-he
has requested service of it and has paid a fee for that purpose. 57
A subsequent discussion of the right of redemption will explore
the methods of serving this notice in more detail, but it should be
stated at this point that the service of this notice is a matter of considerable delicacy and relatively minor defects in the procedure may
have disastrous results for the tax sale purchaser.
Ninety days after service of the notice of expiration of the period
of redemption is completed, the time for redemption expires. 5t
Then, and only then, is the tax sale purchaser entitled to a tax deed,
which runs in the name of the State of North Dakota as grantor
and vests in the purchaser "an absolute estate in fee simple in such
lands." "I
If the tax sale results in the purchase of the land by the county
instead of by a private buyer, the procedure is similar in its larger
aspects but the details vary considerably. After the county has purchased the land, no tax sale certificate is isued to it. The records
in the county auditor's office instead stand in lieu of the certificate. o Thereafter, a failure to pay the taxes on the property for
subsequent years is noted on the auditor's records and the entry of
the fact of default is considered the equivalent of the issuance of
a subsequent tax sale certificate."r
If Doe fails to redeem within three years, the county auditor will
issue on or before June 1 of the year following the expiration of the
statutory three year period a notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption.32 In this instance the mortgagee will get notice with53.

Id. §57-2702.

55.

Id. §57-2702.

56.

In the event that Doe

54. Id. §57-2422.

is a non-resident, service

is made by registered mail.

Otherwise it is delivered to the sheriff, who is required to either serve it personally, or
cause it to be served personally, upon the landowner. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2702 (1943).
57. Ibid.
58. ld. §57-2704.
59. Id. §57-2705.
60. Id. §57-2423.
61. ld. §57-2425.
62. ld. §57-2801.
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out the necessity for the payment of a fee, so long as his mortgage
is of record "3-an interesting variation from the cases where the
tax sale is to a private buyer. On or before August first, in addition,
the county auditor will serve notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption as to tracts purchased by the county on which the
statutory period has run by publishing a notice in the official
newspaper of the county.64
Upon the expiration of the time set forth in the notice of expiration of the period of redemption, the county auditor is required to
issue a tax deed to the county in the usual form, passing title to the
county in fee simple."2 The real estate thus acquired is thereupon
appraised by the board of county commissioners and a maximum
sale price is set. 6 Since a sale of t'he land by the county at a price
which is too low may adversely affect the rights of other governmental units which had a hand in levying the taxes on the property
in the first instance and will share in the proceeds of the sale, these
67
organs may protest the valuation thus placed on the property.
It will be postulated in Doe's case that no such complications develop, and the next step in the proceedings is the posting of a
notice of sale with respect to the land at the front door of the county
courthouse by the county auditor, followed by its publication in the
official newspaper.6 8 A public sale will then be held on the third
Tuesday of November,6 9 each tract of land being knocked down
to the highest bidder,70 who is then entitled to a deed from the
71
county.
In the event that the land is not purchased at the annual November sale, it may be sold at private sale by the county auditor to any
person who will pay the minimum sale price fixed by the county
commissioners. 72 When this occurs, the former owner of the land
must be given thirty days notice of the fact that the sale is to take
place, to give him one last opportunity to redeem from the tax
sale.73 If he fails to do so, the sale is completed and the deed is
issued.
At this point, whether the land has been sold in the first instance
to a private purchaser or has taken the alternative route of sale to
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§57-2804.
§57-2806.
§57-2809.
§57-2810.
§57-2811.
§57-2814.
§57-2813.
§57-2815.
§57-2816.
§57-2817.
§57-2818.
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the county and subsequent resale, John Doe may be ejected from
the property and the purchaser of the land becomes entitled to its
possession. It should not be assumed, however, that the ejection of
Doe, even though it may be constructive in nature, should be undertaken lightly or viewed as a casual matter. The right to take
possession upon issuance of the tax deed depends upon the regularity of the antecedent proceedings, and in the event these have
been defective and the tax sale purchaser goes into possession of
the property and takes the rents and profits, he becomes liable for
the value of the use and occupancy of the property during the time
he remains in possession, up to a maximum of six years. 4
Hitherto in this discussion, John Doe has been depicted as a figure of majestic calm and Olympian indifference to what has been
occurring. He has remained unruffled and steadfast through a
fusillade of impressively captioned legal notices, statutory warnings, and ominous legal proceedings which would have shaken the
fortitude of all but the most redoubtable of landowners. It is regrettable, therefore, to discover that at this juncture his complacency gives way and is transformed into a mighty wrath. He now
descends upon the office of the nearest attorney, breathing smoke
and fire, and demanding the immediate vindication of his rights.
A new case involving tax deeds has been born.
The attorney thus retained will shortly find that the law of tax
titles is in reality not a unified and cohesive body of law at all.
It is, instead, composed of a heterogeneous collection of statutes
passed at different times for different purposes, many of them in'consistent, supplemented by a body of case law as complex and
difficult as any to be found in the books. The various grounds of
attack upon tax deeds and the methods of defending their validity
accordingly engross Doe's counsel. A host of problems unfold before him as he reads his way into the literature of the subject.
What is the basic effect of a tax deed? What specific defects in the
proceedings are available to Doe in his effort to undo what has
been done? What limitations exist upon the right to bring an action
attacking the validity of the proceedings? What other defenses
may be presented? These and other questions form the basis of the
succeeding portions of this paper.
III.
BASIC EFFECT AND CHARACTER OF INTEREST CREATED BY TAX DEED

Many cases attest to the fact that there are several generally
74.

Belakion v. Hilstad, 76 N.D. 298, 35 N.W.2d 637 (1949).
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recognized theories in this country concerning the nature of the
interest vested in a purchaser who takes an interest in land through
tax sale proceedings. The conventional usage is to classify the various states according to the basic theory of taxation employed in
each. Thus in many states it is held that the tax liability which must
be borne by a person who possesses an interest in real property is
a personal liability in much the same way that a contract debt is
a personal liability. Accordingly, in those states when a taxpayer
becomes delinquent and a tax sale occurs it is only the rights,
privileges, powers and immunities belonging specifically and individually to the defaulting taxpayer which pass to the tax sale
purchaser. 75 These jurisdictions, in which the interest obtained by
the purchaser is regarded as being identical with that owned by the
delinquent taxpayer, are referred to as "in personam" jurisdictions.
The opposing viewpoint is held in the so-called "in rem" jurisdictions. In such states it is held that the purchaser at a tax sale
gets a completely new fee simple title through his purchase, regardless of the quantum of the estate possessed by the delinquent
taxpayer.76 The major premise from which this conclusion springs
is that the tax is considered an obligation in rem rather than in
personam, resting upon the land as a res rather than upon the
holder of any particular interest in the land. 77 The consequences
of this theory are often loosely expressed in the statement that the
land itself passes to the purchaser at a tax sale, rather than any
particular estate in it, 78 and that the title created by a tax sale is
non-derivative in character and completely unconnected in any
way with the interest possessed by the former owner of the prop79
erty.
When these latter statements are examined closely, they become
rather difficult to sustain completely. The North Dakota cases furnish a good illustration of the true situation. While the territorial
75. The cases and statutes on this point have been carefully collected in Kloek,
Effect of Tax Deeds on Easements Appurtenant and Rights of Way, 16 Chi-Kent L.
Rev. 328, 357 et seq. (1938), and no attempt will be made to restate them here. A
further collection of authorities appears in Note, 75 A.L.R. 416 (1931).
76. Kloek, supra note 75, at 336 et seq.
77. Bumann v. Burleigh County, 73 N.D. 655, 18 N.W.2d 10 (1945); Nelson v.

Murton, 68 N.D. 108, 277 N.W. 390 (1938); Peterson v. Reishus, 66 N.D. 436, 266
N.W. 417 (1936); Baird v. Stubbins, 58 N.D. 351, 226 N.W. 529 (1929). See also
Thompson, Abstracts and Titles §683 (3nd ed. 1930).
78. See cases cited note 77, supra.
79. The statement that the title acquired at a tax sale is independent and not
derivative has been frequently made in the cases. Rufford G. Patton has commented
that the "statement can be, correct in those cases only where the tax title has first gone
to the state, and that it is then technically correct only when the state acquired title by
forfeiture rather than by foreclosure of a tax lien. In all cases of foreclosure, whether the
purchaser is the state or a private party, it is a derivative title which is acquired, the

same as would be the case on foreclosure of any other type of lien." Patton, Transfers by
Judicial or Statutory Process in 3 American Law of Property 545 (1952).
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tax laws were drafted on the theory that taxes on real property
constituted a personal liability on the part of the landowner, the
in rem theory of taxation was adopted with the coming of statehood.', Indeed, the statutes at present are unequivocal in their
adoption of the in rem theory: as previously pointed out, they
specifically provide that tax deeds are to be issued in the name of
the State of North Dakota as grantor 81 and that the purchaser is
to receive an "absolute estate in fee simple." 82 In addition, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota has repeatedly stated the law to
be that the purchaser 'at a tax sale gets a completely new title by
direct grant from the state, antagonistic to and completely independent of the title held by the prior owner.s
Despite the impressive mass of authority thus built up, the North
Dakota Court found it necessary to materially qualify its position
on this question as recently as 1950. The case involved was Conlin
v. Metzger, 4 which concerned an appurtenant easement of way
which had been acquired by a process of prescriptive use commencing at some time between the years 1910 and 1918 and continuing for 20 or more years.85 The question was whether a sale
of the land for delinquent taxes operated to cut off the right of
easement. This has been a subject of considerable litigation in other
jurisdictions, and varying results have been obtained. In states
where the in personam theory of taxation is employed, the problem
of course solves itself. All that passes at a tax sale is the interest
which the defaulting taxpayer actually enjoyed in the land, and
such states accordingly hold that the easement or servitude is not
cut off by the sale." But in states employing the in rem theory of
taxation, where the courts are committed to the principle that the
sale of land for delinquent taxes results in the creation of an entirely new estate in fee simple in the land, the problem is a serious
one. A few of these states have held that easements and other
servitudes which restricted the use of the property by the former
owner must be destroyed by the sale of the land for taxes or the
statutory mandate that the purchaser is to receive a fee simple
80. Zuger, supra note 20, at 49.
81. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2706 (1943). In a number of cases it has been
that where a tax deed is issued in the name of the county auditor as grantor, the
is void. Heier v. Olson, 75 N.D. 541, 30 N.W.2d 613 (1947); Goss v. Herman, 20
295, 127 N.W. 78 (1910); State Finance Co. v. Mulberger, 16 N.D. 214, 112
986 (1907). But cf. Buman v. Sturn, 73 N.D. 561, 16 N.W.2d 837 (1945).
82. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2705 (1943).
83. See cases cited note 77, supra.
84. 77 N.D. 620, 44 N.W.2d 617 (1950).
85. N.D. Rev. Code §128-0104, 47-0602 (1943).
86. Kloek,.supra note 75, at 357-66.

held
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title has not been carried out. 87 It is pointed out in the cases so
holding that a tax sale is really the foreclosure of a lien upon the
land, and that the statutes ordinarily make the lien of taxes paramount to all other interests in the land. 88 This is the case in North
Dakota.8 9
In Conlin v. Metzger, however, the Court did not find it necessary to ground its decision upon a reliance on the differences between states adopting the in personam theory and those possessing
the in rem theory of taxation. Instead, with obvious accuracy, it
held that the question depended upon the nature of the assessment
which had been made of the land. "Only the interest properly assessed can be sold," 1o declared the opinion. Since the tax delinquency involved in the case had commenced one year before the
earliest possible commencement of the adverse use, it was obvious
that the assessment for that year must have been based upon the
value of the property unincumbered by the easement, and the sale
of the land for that assessment therefore cut off all subsequently
created interests.
It is believed that the theory thus enunciated by the court as to
what passes at a tax sale states the scientific test. The rule has been
stated as follows: "Where a parcel of land is valued as if it existed
as an unincumbered fee simple, disregarding any easement that
may exist, and the summation of interests therein is made liable
for the tax with no personal liability against the owners contemplated, then upon the tax sale that summation of interests passes to
the purchaser." 91 Conversely, where the reduction in value of the
servient tenement and the increase in value of the dominant tenement which occur by reason of the existence of an easement or servitude are reflected by the tax assessments, it is generally held
that the sale of the land for taxes does not destroy the interest of
the owner of the dominant tenement, since the taxes upon the
servitude or easement are in effect paid by the owner of the dom87. Alamagordo Improvement Co. v. Hennessee, 40 N.M. 162, 56 P.2d 1127
(1936) (possibility of reverter cut off by tax sale); Hil v. Williams, 104 Md. 595,
65 At. 413 (1906) (easement of way cut off by tax sale); Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash.
81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911) (easement of way cut off by tax sale); In re Hunt and Bell,
34 Ont. L. R. 256, 24 D.L.R. 590 (1915) (restrictive covenant removed from land
by tax sale).
88, Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911); In re Hunt and Bell, 34
Ont. L. R. 256, 24 D.L.R. 590 (1915).
89. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0240 (1943). See Thompson, A Practical Treatise on
Abstracts and Titles 867 (2d ed. 1930).
90. Conlin v. Metzger, 77 N.D. 620, 622, 44 N.W.2d 617, 619 (1950).
91. 49 Mich. L. Re-i. 293, 294 (1950).
For other law review discussions, see
Kloek, Effect of Tax Deeds on Easements Appurtenant and Rights of Way, 16 Chi-Kent
Rev. 328 (1938); Thompson, Taxation of Easements, 8 Mich. L. Rev. 361 (1910);
Note, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 458 (1950); Note, 16 Wash. L. Rev. 36 (1941). See also
Note, 163 A.L.R. 529 (1947).
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inant tenement by reason of the increase in the assessed value of
his land. 92 This is the view of the Restatement of Property, 3 although in the case of an easement in gross the Restatement takes
the position that the tax sale destroys the easement because the
value of the use of the land allowed by such an easement is not
94
reflected in any change in the assessed valuation of the land.
Conlin v. Metzger, since it dealt with a situation where the easement had been acquired after the tax delinquency had occurred,
did not establish a rule for the much more common situation where
the easement is acquired before the tax delinquency takes place.
It would seem probable that the view of the Restatement as cited
above would nevertheless prevail in this state. The court obviously
adopted the rationale of the Restatement in disposing of the situation presented in the Conlin case, and a reading of the statutes
indicates that it is contemplated that the value of easements shall
be included in assessing the dominant tenement. Thus, it is provided specifically that "real property, for the purposes of taxation,
includes the land itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise,
and . . .all . .. rights and privileges thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining."95 It is further provided that "assessors . . .
shall assess and return all taxable property at its full and true
value," ; which means, as a matter of statutory definition, "the price
at which it could be obtained at private sale." 97 Since the existence
of an easement or servitude appurtenant to a piece of property
would normally cause a fluctuation in its sale value, it seems clear
that the statutes intend the assessed value of the land to vary accordingly.
The point, however, is not completely clear. In the past, as already noted, the court has repeatedly stated that the effect of a
tax sale in this state is to create a completely new and unincumbered title in the holder of a tax deed.98 These precedents, when
read in connection with the statute making the lien of taxes a para92. Tax Lien Co. of New York v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751 (1914);
Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946) (a thoughtful discussion of the
problem is
contained in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe); Restatement,
Property §509, comment d (1944). Semble, District of Columbia v. Capital Mortgage &
Title Co., 84 F.Supp. 788 (D.C. 1949), 49 Mich. L. Rev. 293 (1950).
93. Restatement, Property §509, comment d (1944). But see Hanson v. Carr, 66
Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927 (1911), in which the court said: "No doubt the defendants,
prior to the foreclosure proceedings, might have had the land upon which their easement
was located segregated and a pro tanto reduction of the tax. . . . But having neglected
that remedy, it is too late to say that the easement did not go with the land to the
purchaser at tthe tax sale."
94. Restatement, Property §509 (1) (1944).
95. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0204 (1953).
96. Id. §57-0228.
97. Id. §57-0201 (4).
98. See cases cited note 77, supra.
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mount interest, 99 furnish no little support for an argument that a
tax sale might be deemed to cut off an easement even in the case
where it was created prior to the tax delinquency. Other courts
have so held in the past,' 0 and the North Dakota Court expressly
left the question open in Conlin v. Metzger. The problem is one
which can at times assume unexpected importance, as the note appended in the margin indicates, because of the multitude of easements and other servitudes which exist in favor of public utilities,
such as telephone and electric power companies. 10 1 It has been
suggested in other studies that the best solution lies in legislation."'2
Conlin v. Metzger is the latest case in this jurisdiction dealing
with the effect of a tax sale as cutting off prior interests in land.
But the effect of the rule that a purchaser at a tax sale gets a completely new fee simple interest is also felt in other situations. It
necessarily carries with it the corollary proposition that upon the
issuance of a valid tax deed, all previously existing interests in the
property are destroyed."°3 Thus, it has been said that a tax deed
"cuts off and divests estates in remainder or reversion, rent charges,
trust estates, homestead interests, inchoate rights of dower, mortgages and other encumbrances, judgment liens and even back taxes
and tax titles." 104 This is manifestly the law in North Dakota; indeed, in the cases where the point might have arisen, the result
99. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0240 (1943).
100. In addition to the cases cited in note 87, supra, see Atkins v. Hinman, 7 Ill.
(2 Gilman) 437 (1845); Nedderman v. Des Moines, 221 Iowa 1351, 268 N.W. 36
(1936); Lucas v. Purdy, 142 Iowa 359, 120 N.W. 1063 (1909); Davis v. Allen, 224
Mass. 551, 113 N.E. 304 (1916); Abbott v. Frost, 185 Mass. 598, 70 N.E. 478
(1904); Jones v. Devore, 8 Ohio St. 430 (1858).
101. "A few years ago in Pennsylvania an attorney purchased a tax deed
covering a piece of property over which a company had constructed a pipe line. After
the period of redemption had expired, the owner wrote the company and informed them
that if they wished to retain their easement, they could do so by paying $50,000. In a few
days he increased this figure to $100,000 and then to $150,000. He then wrote the
company informing them that he would add $100 to the last amount for each
day they delayed in accepting his offer. Still getting no action out of the company,
he began to dig under the pipe line so as to undermine it. He then notified the company
that if they did not meet his demands he would break the pipe. The oil company secured
a preliminary injunction restraining the owner from further endangering their plant, and
the latter brought an action of ejectment. The lower court held for the plaintiff, but,
happily for the pipe line company, the supreme court reversed the decision, holding that
the purchaser of the tax deed had taken the property subject to the easement. While the
state of Pennsylvania, by statute, gives pipe-line companies the right to eminent domain,
not all of our states give them such rights and in the latter jurisdictions a decision holding
that the easement was extinguished by the tax deed would have been very serious to
such companies." Kloek, Effect of Tax Deeds on Easements Appurtenant and Rights of
Way, 16 Chi-Kent Rev. 328 (1938). The case involved is Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Bell,
280 Pa. 104, 124 Atl. 351 (1924).
102. Note, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 458 (1950).
103. Flick, Abstract and Title Practice §601 (1951); Thompson, Abstracts and
Titles 866-67 (2d ed. 1930); 3 Cooley, Taxation §1492 (4th ed. 1924); Black, Tax
Titles 6420 (2d ed. 1893); Blackwell, Tax Titles §954 (5th ed. 1889).
104. Cooley, Taxation §1492 (4th ed. 1924).
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has usually been assumed and the cases argued on the assumption
that this was the proper interpretation. 10 5
Nevertheless, a few aspects of the rule will repay exploration.
Despite the provisions of the statute, there is at least one major
right with respect to property which a tax deed by its very nature
does not terminate. This is the right of redemption enjoyed by certain persons under a disability-minors, insane persons, and prisoners of war-who are entitled to redeem from a tax sale at any time
within three years after their disability ceases despite the issuance
of a tax deed. 10 6 The precise extent of this right of redemptioni.e., whether it extends to the whole property where the redemptioner posseses only an undivided interest-has been the subject
7
of relatively recent litigation and is discussed subsequently.'0
Another interesting problem in this connection concerns the
effect of a tax deed on contingent future interests. The idea that
a tax deed cuts off all preceding interests may have some practical
justification in the fact that the purchase of land at a tax sale is
undoubtedly more attractive to the purchaser if he is assured of
receiving a fee simple title. It possesses, however, a few logical
drawbacks. To take a common example, assume a case where A
is a life tenant and B is a remainderman. As between the two, the
life tenant is under the duty of paying the taxes."'" But on his
failure to do so, he places not only his own interest but that of the
remainderman in jeopardy, since the tax deed will cut off the remainder interest if the tax sale proceedings are carried through to
the point where a valid tax deed is issued.109 Where B is a vested
remainderman, this situation does not necessarily lead to hardship;
the remainderman is entitled to pay the taxes himself and bring an
action against the life tenant to recover," 0 or he can redeem from
105. Thus in Sailer v. Mercer County, 75 N.D. 123, 26 N.W.2d 137 (1947).
the controversy was over the right of a purchaser from a remainderman to redeem from a'
tax sale, the holding of the case being clearly based on the assumption that the remainder
interest would be cut off by the issuance of a tax deed if redemption did not take place.
In First National Bank v. Mohall State Bank, 53 N.D. 319, 206 N.W. 411 (1925), it
was argued that the lien of a mortgage was cut off by a tax deed. Emmons County v.
Bennett, 9 N.D. 131, 81 N.W. 22 (1899) holds that a regularly issued tax deed cuts
off delinquent taxes for years previous to that upon which the deed is based. And in
Meldahl v. Dobbin, 8 N.D. 115, 77 N.W. 280 (1898), it was held that a later tax
deed cut off all interest under a prior tax deed.
See also Fleck, Abstract and Title
106. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2604 (1943).
Practice §601 (1951).
107. See "The Right of Redemption," Part II of this discussion.
108. N.D. Rev. Code §47-0234 (1943); Restatement, Property §129 (1936).
109. Cummings v. Cummings, 91 Fed. 602 (W.D.N.C. 1899); Watkins v. Green,
101 Mich. 493, 60 N.W. 44 (1894). The entire topic is discussed in an excellent note,
Quantum of Estate Acquired by Purchaser at Tax Sale of Property Which is Subject to
Successive Estates or Different Interests, 75 A.L.R.416 (1931). See note 105, supra.
110. -Watkins v. Green, 101 Mich. 493, 60 N.W. 44 (1894).
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the sale after it has taken place and once again recover the sums
expended from the life tenant.""
However, if one postulates a case where the remainder interest
is contingent, as in the case where it is limited to a person not in
being or not capable of ascertainment, the courses of action outlined
above are obviously not available to the remainderman. Remarkably few cases deal with this situation. It is not possible to serve a
notice of the expiration of the period of redemption upon a remainderman who is unascertained, or to give him notice of the tax
sale in writing as required by the North Dakota statutes. 112 Nevertheless, it has been specifically held that the interests of contingent
remindermen are cut off by a tax deed, and the standard authorities
assert this as the correct result.' 13 The line of reasoning used in
support of this outcome, however, seems unclear and unsatisfactory.
The Georgia court, in reaching this conclusion, simply cited a
heterogeneous collection of local cases dealing with the effect of
tax sales on vested interests but made no attempt to demonstrate
the applicability of these precedents to the case of the contingent
remainderman.11
Historically it is possible to develop at least some justification for
the rule in some jurisdictions. At common law the destruction of
the preceding freehold interest prior to the time when the condition precedent which is the essence of the contingent remainder
could be fulfilled automatically destroyed the remainder."' It was
possible, therefore, to destroy a contingent remainder without notice to the remainderman. If, to cite a simple example, A conveyed
to B for life, with remainder to B's first son to reach the age of 21,
111. Black, Tax Titles §419 (2d ed.1893).
112. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2401 (1943), set forth in full in note 41, supra. It
might be pointed out that in the case of many other interests-particularly easements and
restrictive covenants-such a notice might very well not be given by the local authorities.
It was said, however, in the case of In re Hunt and Bell, 34 Ont. L. R. 256, 24 D.L.R.
590, 596 (1915), that since a list of lands liable to tax sale was purchased before each
tax sale, such publication gave notice to holders of such interests in property. "The tax
being a charge upon the property itself, to the payment of which all persons having any
interest in the land are . . . bound to look, they are not exonerated from exercising
vigilance in protecting their rights."
113. Bell v. Summerlin, 188 Ga. 648, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939) (interest of contingent
remaindermen held cut off by sale of land for delinquent taxes). Cf. Jackson v. Babcock,
16 N.Y. 246 (1857). See also Black, Tax Titles §421 (2d ed. 1893); Blackwell, Tax
Titles §954 (5th ed. 1889) (posing the question but not answering it specifically).
Compare the following language, appearing in Blackwell, Tax Titles §954 (5th ed.
1893): "At law and in equity, he (the tenant for life) is bound to pay all legal
assessments upon the land. He fails to do so after notice and demand, a sale is made
and the officer conveys to the purchaser. No demand was ever made upon the remainderman for the tax and he had no notice of its assessment. Everyone would say, at first
blush, that it would be a monstrous species of injustice to hold that his interest in the
estate was divested by such a proceeding. .. "
114. Bell v. Summerlin, supra note 113.
115. Leake, Property in Land 238-39 (Randall ed. 1909).
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the state of the title would be: life estate in B, contingent remainder
to B's first son to reach 21, and reversion in A. If A now conveyed
his reversionary interest to B, the contingent remainder was regarded as being terminated. The merger of the reversion and the
life estate would create an estate in fee simple in B, and since the
destruction of the life estate by the merger terminated the estate
of freehold supporting the contingent remainder, it would automatically be cut off.116
Manifestly, in a jurisdiction where this doctrine is still in effect,
a tax sale has precisely the same effect as the destruction by forfeiture or merger of a freehold upon which a contingent remainder is
dependent. Since the tax sale wipes out the estate of freehold upon
which the contingent remainder depends, it should logically have
the effect of wiping out the contingent remainder. But in a state
where the doctrine that contingent remainders are destructible has
been abolished, as is the case in North Dakota, the rule seems questionable.117 However, a specific conclusion on the question probably
cannot be drawn in advance of an adjudication by the court.
A further consequence of the doctrine that a tax deed which is
valid carries a completely new fee simple to the grantee should
also be mentioned. The effect of the rule on the operation of the
recording act has been unique. The usual situation in which the
recording act becomes important is found in the case where A
conveys to B, who fails to record and thereby leaves outstanding
in A the power to convey a second time to a bona fide purchaser,
C, who by recording can cut off B's interest. 1 8 In Baird v. Stubbins,119 a 1929 decision, the effect of the recording act upon the
interest of a tax sale purchaser was first considered by the North
Dakota Court. The land in question was owned by A, who failed
to pay the taxes. B obtained a tax deed to the land which he did
not record. C then sued A, recovered a judgment against him,
levied execution on the land and purchased it at the execution sale,
recording his deed. Upon learning of B's tax deed, C sued to quiet
title on the theory that he was protected by the recording act,
which in this state specifically protects judgment creditors as bona
fide purchasers.120
While the resemblance of Baird v. Stubbins to the ordinary situation in which the recording act applies is strong, the court ruled
116.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Ibid.

N.D. Rev. Code §§47-0230, 47-0234 (1943).
Restatement, Property §3, Ill. 3 (1936).
58 N.D. 351, 226 N.W. 529 (1929), noted 3 Dak. L. Rev. 111 (1930).
N.D. Rev. Code §47-1941 (1943).
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that C was not entitled to succeed. It held that C could not be
considered a subsequent purchaser as far as B was concerned unless C acquired his title from the same source as B. But while C
had acquired his title from A, B had obtained his title by an independent grant from the State of North Dakota-an entirely different source of title. It followed that although C had taken without
notice of prior rights, and had won the race to the recording office,
B was entitled to prevail.121
The reverse of this situation occurred in Bumann v. Burleigh
County.' 22 The record title to this land involved was in X, but the
land was in reality owned by A. Taxes were not paid and the land
was sold at tax sale to B, who obtained a tax deed and promptly
recorded it. A then conveyed to C, who brought suit to set aside
the tax sale on the grounds of a technical invalidity. It was held
that B could not dispute C's right to bring the action on the theory
that he had become an innocent purchaser for value of the premises from the holder of the record title to the time C received a
conveyance from A. Since B's rights and C's rights stemmed from
different sources, the holder of the tax deed could not rely on the
recording act as against a grantee from the prior owner.
Burmann v. Burleigh County is obviously supportable on independent grounds, but the result of Baird v. Stubbins seems questionable. Only one state-New Jersey-has come to a similar conclusion, 12 and the result in that jurisdiction was clearly influenced
by the difficulties of recording tax deeds in New Jersey, where the
indexing system is inadequate to guide persons searching the record
to a tax deed in the chain of title. It is certainly true that in a state
possessing merely a conventional grantor-grantee indexing system
the record of a tax deed from the state, without more, is difficult
to detect by tracing down the chain of title, since no conveyance
"out" from the original owner of the land appears in the grantor
index. But North Dakota possesses a tract index system 124 designed to overcome precisely such difficulties, and the considera-

1921. North Dakota has the so-called "race-notice" type of recording statute,
N.D. Rev. Code §47-1941 (1943), in addition to a tract index which is used far more
extensively than the normal grantor-grantee index. The unusual difficulties of North
Dakota law with respect to the precise effect of the tract index are discussed at some
length in note 125.
122. 73 N.D. 655, 18 N.W.2d 10 (1945).
123. LaCombe v. Headley, 89 N.J. Eq. 364, 104 AtI. 711 (1918), aff'd, 91 N.J.
Eq. 63, 108 Atl. 185 (1919).
124. N.D. Rev. Code §11-1807 (1943).-
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tions which moved the New Jersey court should therefore be lack1 25
ing in this state.
Most of the states which have considered the problem have come
to the conclusion that a tax deed can be cut off by a conveyance
from the former owner to a bona fide purchaser, where the tax deed
is not placed of record. 126 This result seems sounder in terms of
the objectives which the recording acts were designed to achieve.
As a New York decision has put it, "The object of the statute was
125.

It should be pointed out, however, that under the decisions of the North

Dakota Supreme Court a considerable measure of uncertainty surrounds the precise operation
of the tract index. See Maxwell, The Tract Index and Notice in North Dakota, 25 N.D.
Bar Briefs 176 (1949), for a discussion of the authorities. Basically, the difficulty stems
from the language of §47-1946, N.D. Rev. Code (1943):
"An unrecorded instrument is
valid as between the parties thereto and those who have notice thereof. Knowledge of
the record of an instrument out of the chain of title does not constitute such notice."
(Emphasis supplied). This statute may have imported "into the law of North Dakota
many of the subtleties of recording act priorities that have developed from the difficulties
of search inherent in the grantor and grantee index." Maxwell, supra, at 180. The actual
operation of the statute is best illustrated by McCoy v. Davis, 38 N.D. 328, 164 N.W.
951 (1917):
O'Connor owned Blackacre. The defendant got a judgment against him.
Before the judgment was docketed-and thus before the judgment became a lien on the
land-O'Connor conveyed to the nlaintiff, a bona fide purchaser who did not record
However, the plaintiff gave O'Connor a purchase money mortgage and O'Connor immediately
recorded it. Thereafter the defendant docketed his judgment, levied execution and purchased
the land at the sale, all these proceedings being properly conducted. He thus acquired
the land at a time when the record title was in O'Connor, but the mortgage from the
plaintiff to O'Connor was also of record and apparent on the face of the tract index. In
an action to try the title to the land, the plaintiff contended that the record of the
mortgage gave notice to the defendant of the- plaintiff's interest in the land. It was held
to the contrary. While the court recognized that in other jurisdictions possessing a tract
index a different result had been reached in similar cases, it justified the outcome on
the basis of the statute cited above. Since the mortgage was out of the chain of title it
did not constitute record notice.
Again, consider this hypothetical case: A owns Blackacre. He agrees to convey
to B and signs a contract which B does not record. On the strength of this contract, C
advances money to B and takes a mortgage on the property, which he records. B thereafter records his deed, so that both deed and the mortgage appear on the fact of the tract
index. B now conveys the land to D, who knows that the tract index lists a mortgage
to C. Does D take subject to the mortgage? As between B and C, there is no doubt of
the mortgage's effectiveness. The doctrine of estoppel by deed would be applicable and
is well recognized in North Dakota. But D is entitled to argue the further point that
the mortgage is not in the chain of title," and that it is therefore not binding on him.
In a jurisdiction which did not possess a tract index, D would have had to search the
grantor index under the grantor's name for a period of time prior to the date when his
grantor got title in order to uncover the mortgage. The overwhelming weight of authority
in this country is to the effect that an instrument which can only be uncovered by such a
search is outside the chain of title. Patton, Priorities, Recording, Registration, in 4 Am.
Law of Property 596 (1952). Thus, under the general rule as to what constitutes a chain
of title, D would be entitled to take free and clear of the mortgage, though it appeared
on the face of the tract index when he purchased.
If the illustration seems fanciful,
compare McCoy v. Davis, supra. See also Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N.D. 638, 147 N.W.
804 (1914); Doran v. Dazey, 5 N.D. 167, 64 N.W. 1023 (1895). Oklahoma is the
only other state in the union which has gotten itself mixed up concerning the operation of
its tract index in the same manner as North Dakota. Perkins v. Cissel, 32 Okla. 827, 124
Pac. 7 (1912).
In the light of this situation, the decision in Baird v. Stubbins is probably as good as
any. Since a tax deed does not run in the name of the former owner, it is not in the
the chain of title and therefore would not constitute record notice even if it appeared on
the tract index. It would seem that the wisdom of the last sentence of §47-1946, Supra,
is highly questionable. It is submitted that it ought to be repealed.
126.
Maddox v. Arthur, 122 Ga. 671, 50 S.E. 668 (1905); Littlefield v. Prince,
96 Me. 499, 52 At. 1010 (1902); Sintes v. Barber, 78 Miss. 585, 29 So. 403 (1901);
New Hanover Shingle Co. v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 178 N.C. 221, 100 S.E. 332
(1919); Fernhough v. Rockwell, 31 S.D. 75, 139 N.W. 790 (1913); Wildell Lumber
Co. v. Turk, 75 W.Va. 26, 83 S.E. 83 (1914).
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to enable purchasers to ascertain* the validity of the title and to
determine whether they could purchase with safety; and the law
refers them to the record for this purpose." 127 Obviously this broad
aim of the statute in North Dakota is to some extent frustrated by
the present holding with respect to tax deeds. However, the decision in Baird v. Stubbins created no insoluble problem. What has
happened is that the task of examining a title now includes a search
of the records in the county auditor's office to determine whether
a tax sale has occurred.
IV.
GROUNDS FOR ATTACK UPON TAX DEEDS AND TAX SALE PROCEEDINGS

In order thoroughly to understand the cases dealing with attacks upon tax deeds and tax sale proceedings, it is necessary to
grasp the operation of a rather complex piece of statutory machinery. Section 57-2429 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943
provides:
Tax sale certificates, either original or subsequent, in all cases
shall be prima facie evidence that all the requirements of law
with respect to the sale have been complied with and that the
grantee therein is entitled to a deed therefor after the time of
redemption has expired. No sale shall be set aside nor held invalid unless the party objecting to the same shall prove that:
1. The property upon which the tax was levied was not
subject to taxation;
2. The taxes were paid prior to such sale;
3. Notice of such sale as required by law was not given; or
4. The piece or parcel of land was not offered at said sale
to the bidder who would accept the lowest rate of interest on the amount for which the piece or parcel was
to be sold.
In any such case, but in no other, the court may set aside the
sale or reduce the amount of taxes upon the land, rendering
judgment accordingly.
The decisions have construed this section in such. a way as to
give it a two-fold or dual effect. In Beggs v. Paine,12 8 the first case
in which it received the court's full and sharp attention, it was
compared both to a statute of limitations and a curative statute. 12 9
It was considered curative because it attempted to make many of
127. Jackson ex dem. Merritt v. Terry, 13 Johns 471, 473 (N.Y. 1816).
128. 15 N.D. 436, 109 N.W. 322 (1906).
129. In the sense in which the court used the term here, curative legislation was
retroactive in character. It was used in some of the early cases to cure minor informalities
and defects in the porceedings leading up to a tax sale. The attempt to limit attacks
upon tax sales to cases where only the four grounds of attack found in §57-2429, supra,
were present represented an effort to "cure" future proceedings. The topic of
curative and retroactive legislation is discussed in Part II of this paper, which will appear
in the October, 1953, issue of the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
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the objections which had been raised against tax sales prior to its
enactment immaterial. While the court pointed out that the section
could not operate in such a way as to retroactively validate void
sales, it said that since the legislature had the power "by a subsequent statute to cure or declare immaterial any nonobservance of
purely statutory requirements, it is self-evident that this power
could be exercised by inserting the curative provisions in the same
act which authorized and governed the proceedings." 130
It is, however, the comparison of the statute to a statute of limitation which deserves the closest attention. Beggs v. Paine in substance construed the statute to mean that if a statutory defect or
irregularity occurred during the course of the proceedings leading
up to a tax sale, the irregularity or defect not being one of the four
specified in the statute, the right to object to the defect was lost
if the objection was not made prior to the tax sale.131 "This presents," said the Court, "what we have termed the limitation feature
of section [57-2429] . . . .The legislature had the power and we
think it was the intention to declare by this section of the law that
the neglect of the taxpayer to resort to an appropriate remedy for
relief from a prejudicial irregularity in the tax proceedings before
the sale, should be a bar to any relief, unless the defect complained
of consists of one or more of those objections specified in the section or is some other defect which it is beyond the power of the
legislature to remedy by a curative statute or bar by a statute of
" 13
limitations which is not based on adverse possession. 2
The description of the statute as being one of limitation, however, in reality appears misleading. The rule which Beggs v. Paine
laid down actually was a forerunner of the doctrine of administrative law to the effect that unless a litigant has pursued his administrative remedies be has no right to come into court for relief from
the consequences of administrative action.'
But regardless of how
130.

Beggs v. Paine, 15 N.D. 436, 449, 109 N.W. 322, 328 (1906).

131.
Illustrative of the effect of this rule is the case of Anderson v. Roberts, 71
N.D. 345, 1 N.W.2d 338 (1941). The plaintiff brought an action to quiet title to land
which he had acquired from a country on a contract for deed, the county having acquired
title by virtue of tax sale proceedings based on a 1931 tax delinquency. The defendant
argued that the tax sale was invalid because: (1)
the assessor's return valuing the land
for tax purposes, was not verified; (2) the record of the township board of equalization
was not signed nor certified; (3) the school district in which the land was located failed
to make a budget for the year 1931-a statutory prerequisite to taxation; and (4) the
land involved was described improperly in the assessment roll and the assessment was
therefore void. The court held that by virtue of the statute it was too late to raise
the first three objections. "Unless the defects complained of are specified in the statute
or are beyond the power of the legislature to remedy they may not be asserted after
certificates of sale have been issued." Accord, Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 2 N.W.2d

537 (1942).
132. Beggs v. Paine, 15 N.D. 436, 450, 109 N.W. 322, 328 (1906).
133.

Dakota

Corporation v. Slope County,

296 U.S. 593 (1935).

75

F.2d 587

(8th Cir.)

cert.

denied,
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the rule is characterized, it is obviously of fundamental importance.
Almost every subsequent case which has dealt with attacks upon
the validity of tax deeds has considered it.
As the language quoted indicates, the Court, in its initial consideration of the statute, did not accept it as conclusive. Indeed,
Beggs v. Paine gave it a highly restricted scope of operation, confining it effectively to those cases in which the defect or error in
the tax deed proceedings was non-jurisdictional in character. One
may hazard the guess that the court had future possibilities in
mind when it included the following paragraph in the opinion:
Taken literally, (the statute) could not be sustained to its full
extent, because there are objections not mentioned which the
legislature could not bar, as for instance the want of an assessment or the absence of any levy. The provisions of -the
statute must be deemed to be predicated upon the hypothesis
that the power and jurisdiction to sell for a tax the particular
property affected has been initiated by some proceeding which
is inherently, and under the provisions of the constitution, sufficient to create a tax and fix it as a charge upon the land to
be sold. Speaking in general terms, there must be an assessment
and a levy of a tax for which the property to be sold can be
constitutionally held liable. If these are wanting, there is no
power to sell."'
In the light of the tax deed's history in the courts, this language
possesses an obvious purpose. It imported into the construction
of this section of the law a device-the "jurisdictional defect"which had proved eminently successful in the past when employed
135
against other legislation the court felt to be unduly hampering.
In short, the Court was unwilling to permit its hands to be tied in
cases involving tax deeds, for reasons indicated in the opening
pages of this discussion.
What were the jurisdictional defects which the Court asserted
could be thus employed to defeat a tax sale, notwithstanding the
express provision of the statute? Beggs v. Paine did not enumerate
them in detail; the opinion merely mentioned as examples the failure to assess the land and the failure to make a valid levy of taxes.
But other cases, before and after this decision, have developed a
substantial body of law in this regard. Seven years before Beggs
v. Paine, jurisdictional defects had been listed in Roberts v. First
National Bank of Fargo, 36 involving another section of the statutes,
134. Beggs v. Paine, 15 N.D. 436, 449-50, 109 N.W. 322, 328 (1906).
135. Principally the device of the jurisdictional defect had been used in connection with a three-year statute of limitations applicable to tax deed proceedings, discussed
in Part II of this paper.
136. 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1049 (1899).
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as including "the non-taxability of the property, the absence of
any assessment, the absence of any levy, the fact of payment,
the absence of any tax sale, and the fact of lawful redemption." 137
It is clear that these were also the main jurisdictional defects which
could be employed to prevent the operation of §57-2429.
The cases which have discussed jurisdictional defects have divided them into two classes: they may consist of either (a) a failure to comply with a requirement imposed by statute, or (b) a
failure to comply with a requirement imposed by either the state
or federal constitutions. 131 This classification, of course, carries
with it the corollary proposition that the legislature might, if it
wished, dispense with jurisdictional requirements of the first class,
since if the legislature has the ability to make a thing jurisdictional
it must also possess the ability to make the same thing non-jurisdictional. As it was interpreted by the Court, the statute did precisely that in most instances. "There can be no doubt that the
section cures or bars every defect which is within the power of
the legislature to declare non-essential," the court declared in
State Finance Company v. Mather.139 While it is possible to point
to occasional exceptions, this seems to be the interpretation which
has been generally observed ever since.
With these observations, it is possible to turn to a discussion of
specific grounds of attack upon tax sale proceedings.
A.

EFFECT OF TAX SALE OF NON-TAxABLE

LAND

The statutes of North Dakota exempt from taxation property
owned by the United States, the State of North Dakota, counties
and other municipal corporations, Indians where the title to such
property is inalienable without the consent of the Secretary of the
Interior, land used for cemeteries, school properties, church build137. Id. at 512, 79 N.W. at 1051.
138. Thus, in Nind v. Meyers & Beck, 15 N.D. 400, 412, 109 N.W. 335, 340
(1906), the court speaks of "This distinction between incurable jurisdictional defects and
those which are jurisdictional only to the extent that the legislature has made them so
. . In State .Finance Co. v, Mather, 15 N.D. 386, 393, 109 N.W. 350, 354 (1906),
the court disapproved the case of Eaton v. Bennett, 10 N.D. 346, 87 N.W. 188 (1901),
saying, "The fallacy of the opinion in Eaton v. Bennett lies in its failure to distinguish
between those things which are mandatory solely because the legislature has seen fit to
make them so, and those things which are inherently or by reason of constitutional provisions essential to the jurisdiction of the taxing power." And in Sheets v. Paine, 10 N.D.
103, 86 N.W. 118 (1901), discussing the subject specifically, the Court said: "Appellant's
counsel contends that only matters prescribed by the constitution of the state are jurisdictional to a tax. Without conceding the soundness of the contention, we are quite willing
to let the organic law speak as to any point made in this case." (Emphasis supplied). While
it would seem more logical to define jurisdictional defects in terms of constitutional provisions, it seems unsafe to do so in the light of the foregoing precedents. It is clear,
however, that a "statutory" jurisdictional defect is normally not as serious as a "constitutional" jurisdiction defect, particularly in the light of §57-2429, supra.
139. 15 N.D. 386, 390 N.W. 350, 352 (1906).
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ings, buildings used for charitable purposes, property owned by
agricultural fair associations, property owned by lodges and other
fraternal organizations, including college fraternities, personal
property owned by insurance companies, banks or rural electric
cooperatives subject to certain other types of taxes in lieu of taxes
upon their personal property, public parks, armories used by the
National Guard, all farm structures and improvements located on
agricultural lands, and property of non-profit organizations operating in conjunction with state educational institutions, plus a few
other minor exemptions with respect to certain classes of personal
property.' °
While the fact that property which has been sold for taxes was
not in reality subject to taxation is considered to be a jurisdictional
defect, 141 it is also one of the four grounds of attack upon a tax sale
specifically permitted by statute.'4 2 The taxable status of the
property is considered jurisdictional because the levying of a tax
upon certain types of property violates the Constitution of North
Dakota, which declares that, "The property of the United States
and of the State, county and municipal corporations, and prdperty
used exclusively for schools, religious, cemetery, charitable and
other public purposes shall be exempt from taxation." 143
Relatively few cases in this state have involved this ground of
attack upon a tax sale. It is clear that such a tax sale is uniformly
held void,'144 and most of the cases involving such tax sales accordingly turn upon other questions-primarily the question of the
rights of the tax sale purchaser to get his money back."'
One interesting case dealing with a tax sale of non-taxable land
is State v. Towner County,"46 an action to quiet title brought by
the State of North Dakota against Towner County. The state had
contracting to sell the land to a private purchaser by an agreement
signed in 1919. From 1920 to 1924 the county accordingly levied
taxes upon the land. These were unpaid. The purchaser then defaulted in his payments on the purchase price and the state cancelled the contract for deed. The county contended that the lien
of taxes still attached to the land after the cancellation of the con140. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0208 (1943).
141. Roberts v. First National Bank of Fargo, 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1049 (1899).
142. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2429 (1) (1943).
143. N.D. Const. §176.
144. Bismarck Water Supply Co. v. Burleigh County, 36 N.D. 191, 161 N.W.
1009 (1917).
145. See McHenry v. Brett, 9 N.D. 68, 81 N.W. 65 (1899); Van Nest v. Sargent
County, 7 N.D. 139, 73 N.W. 1083 (1897); Tisdale v. Ward County, 20 N.D. 401,

127 N.W. 512 (1910).
146. 68 N.D. 629, 283 N.W. 63 (1939).
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tract. It was held that the lien ended with the termination of the
contract. The Court declared that only the interest of the purchaser
was subject to taxation, and when the contract of sale was cancelled the land reverted to the state free and clear of any tax lien.
B.

LACK OF ASSESSMENT

Without an assessment, the Court has repeatedly held, a tax sale
14
is void and may be set aside at the will of the former owner.
Since the lack of an assessment is a jurisdictional defect, the right to
set aside a tax sale which is defective for this reason is not cut off
by the expiration of the three-year period of limitations 148 although
it is immaterial in event other statutes of limitation are called into
play. 14 9 The requirement of an assessment is in reality based on
the provisions of the North Dakota Constitution. Thus, in Sheets v.
Paine, "I where it was argued that the lack of correct description
of the land in the assessment roll voided the assessment, the Court
stated:
"Section 174 [of the North Dakota Constitution] in terms
recognizes the necessity of an assessment as a basis of taxation
. . . and §179 provides that all property shall be assessed
'in the manner prescribed by law'. . . . It must follow, and we
so hold, that the tax deed set out in the defendant's answer
is void . . . because it rests upon a void assessment." I-

Precisely what acts are necessary to the validity of an assessment? In answering this question, the Court has given varying
Tesponses. In many cases, the view apparently taken is that virtually any failure to comply with the statutory provisions governing
assessments is fatal. As Sheets v. Paine indicates, a failure to describe land properly-basically a statutory requirement 12----has
been inconsistently held an insufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate. 5 ' Likewise, a failure to verify the assessment
147. State Finance Co. v. Mather, 15 N.D. 386, 109 N.W. 350 (1906); State
Finance Co. v. Beck, 15 N.D. 374, 109 N.W. 357 (1906); Sheets v. Paine, 10 N.D.
103, 86 N.W. 118 (1901); Shuttuc'k v. Smith, 2 N.D. 56, 69 N.W. 5 (1896); Power
v. Bowdle, 3 N.D. 107, 54 N.W. 404 (1893).
A discussion of the necessity of an
assessment also appears

in

Zuger, Tax Titles, 1949

Sectional Assembly

Program

of the

State Bar Association of North Dakota 48, 51-52.
148. Eaton v. Bennett, 10 N.D. 346, 87 N.W. 188 (1901); Power v. Kitching,
10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W. 737 (1901); Sweigle v. Gates, 9 N.D. 538, 84 N.W. 481
(1900); Roberts v. First National Bank of Fargo, 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1049 (1899).
149. Principally the ten-year statute of limitations, of course. Power v. Kitching,
10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W. 737 (1901).
150. 10 N.D. 103, 86 N.W. 118 (1901).
151. Id. at 106-07, 86 N.W. at 119. See also Blackwell, Tax Titles §§194, 195
(5th ed. 1889).
152. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0234 (1943).
153. See also Power v. Bowdle, 3 N.D. 107, 54 N.W. 404 (1893); Power v.
Larabee, 2 N.D. 141, 49 N.W. 724 (1891); and the cases discussed infra.
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roll,15 4 and an assessment of two lots as one tract, 155 have been held
sufficient in invalidate an assessment, though these defects constituted merely a failure to meet statutory requirements.
In Power v. Larabee,1" an early decision, it was said that the
process of assessment consisted of four steps, the clear implication
being that the omission of any one of these steps was fatal:
First, the land must be described by separate tracts in lists
furnished for the use of the assessor; second, the assessor must
view the land and reach a conclusion in his own mind as to its
value; third, the assessor is required to write out opposite each
tract in the roll the value as he ascertained it to be, and,
finally, the assessor is required to swear to the assessment thus
made, and annex the proper affidavit l to the roll and then
return it to the county clerk or auditor., 5
Justice Bartholomew, concurring in Power v. Larabee, added a
further requirement. He thought that the process of assessment
was not complete until the taxpayer had been given a hearing on
the valuation of the property. While the point is a minor one, it
would seem that this view unnecessarily couples the requirement
of assessment with that of equalization., 58
In later decisions, however, the Court materially narrowed the
rules laid down in Sheets v. Paine and Power v. Larabee. Thus, in
State Finance Co. v. Mather,1 9 it was said that, "The act of assessment is performed as to the land when the assessor determines its
value. That is all that is inherently necessary, and it is clear that
under our system of real estate taxation no less will suffice." 160
This latter rule, if carried to its logical conclusion, would necessarily result in a holding that if the assessor had actually made a
valuation of land, no other defect in the assessment proceedings
could be used to defeat a tax sale unless objection were made prior
to the sale.16e However, the view of Sheets v. Paine was not com154. Eaton v. Bennett, 10 N.D. 346, 87 N.W. 188 (1901). But this case is no
longer law, as the text discussion indicates.
155. State Finance Co. v. Bowdle, 16 N.D. 193, 112 N.W. 76 (1907); Roberts v.
First National Bank of Fargo, 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1049 (1899).
156. 2 N.D. 141, 49 N.W. 724 (1891).
157. Id. at 149, 49 N.W. at 726,
158. See "Equalization of Assessments," infra.
159. 15 N.D. 386, 109 N.W. 350 (1906).
160. Id. at 389, 109 N.W. at 352.
161. Obviously, if the single act of valuation satisfies the constitutional requirement,
the performance of any other acts in connection with the assessment of land must be
regarded as simply a conformity to statutory dictates. So far as statutory requirements
are concerned, it would seem that the rule applicable is that of Beggs v. Paine, supra,
in which it was held that unless an objection to a statutory defect in the tax sale
proceedings is raised prior to the issuance of the certificate of sale, the right is lost
through the operation of N.D. Rev. Code §57-27-2429 (1943). "There can be no doubt that
the section cures or bars every defect which it is Within the power of the legislature to
declare non-essential." State Finance Co. v. Mather,, 15 N.D. 386, 390, .109 N.W.
350, 352 (1906).
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pletely eliminated from the law of North Dakota by the Mather
case, and under the influence of Sheets v. Paine the Court has
found it necessary to engraft several exceptions onto the rule of
the Mather case.
Possibly it is simplest to summarize the law in regard to assessment by saying that there are in reality two basic theories as to
what constitutes a valid assessment in this state: (1) The view of
Sheets v. Paine that a failure to meet the statutory requirements
imposed by the legislature also constitutes a failure to meet the
constitutional requirement of an assessment "in the manner prescribed by law," and (2) the view of State Finance Co. v. Mather
that the constitutional requirement is satisfied once the assessor
has made a de facto valuation of the land. It is between these two
different ideas that the court has oscillated in the later cases. With
regard to the necessity for a description of the land as a prerequisite
to a valid assessment, the view of Sheets v. Paine is still the law;
with regard to other statutory requirements, the view of State
Finance Co. v. Mather is clearly winning out.
1. Lack of Sufficient Description
Most of the cases dealing with the legal sufficiency of assessments turn upon the question of whether the land assessed was
identified with sufficient clarity to be definitely identifiable. This
16 2
is a familiar ground of attack upon tax sales in other states,
and has been more successful than ought to have been the case.
The first case decided in this state dealing with the sufficiency
of a description is an assessment roll was Power v. Larabee,1a in
which the land was described in the assessment roll as "W. 2 of
W. 2, Section 7, Township 143, Range 57." The abbreviation "W. 2"
was clearly a loose method of describing the west one-half of the
land involved, the numeral "2" being used in place of the more
familiar and accurate ",." The court held that the description was
insufficient since it was not "expressed by characters or abbreviations commonly used by conveyancers, or generally understood and
.used by the people at large in describing land," 164 and accordingly
did not meet the legal requirement that it be "reasonably full and
accurate, though it need not be technically nice and scientifically
exact." 165 The court added that the description could not be ex162.
4 Wyo. L.
163.
164.
165.

See Clark, Tax Titles in Mississippi, 17 Miss. L. J. 372, 380 (1946); Note,
J. 262, 264 (1950); Note, 67 A.L.R. 890 (1930) (collecting numerous cases).
2 N.D. 141, 49 N.W. 724 (1891).
Id. at 148, 49 N.W. at 725.
Id. at 148, 49 N.W. at 725-26.

A COMMENTARY ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES

plained or supplemented by oral testimony,'
and accordingly
that the tax sale involved was illegal.
Following the precedent of Power v. Larabee, the following descriptions were held invalid in subsequent cases: E 2 NW4 of Sec.
25, Twp. 141, Rge. 59;17 N 2 of S.E.4 of Sec. 25, Twp. 138, Rge.
56; 168 S.E. 4 S.W. 4 W.2 S.W. 4 of Section 19; 1 S.W. 4 of S.E. 4
of section 32, town. 141, range 50; 170 N.E. 4 of N.W. 4, S. 2 of
N.W. 2 and S.W. 4; 1 the "N. 23 x 200 feet" of a given lot of 600
feet, although the owner of the lot was correctly named in the
assessment roll; 172 N.W. 4 of Section 35, Township 149, Range 56,
Acres 160; 173 an error placing the land in range 55 instead of
range 53; 174 "Cleveland Township, County of Walsh, North Dakota. Name of Owner, Florence B. Martin; description N.W. 4,
Sec. 1, Twp. 155, Rng. 57"; 175 a description of land in a certificate
of tax sale as the "E3 of SW34 of NEJ1"-a description of 20 acres
while the land sold was 120 acres; ' 17 and "S.W. Section 10" without a listing of township or range numbers opposite the name of
the owner, although the correct numbers were listed in columns
at the top of the assessment roll and could easily have been indi177
cated by ditto marks.
Even a cursory glance at the descriptions thus invalidated under
this rule should be sufficient to indicate the. unsoundness of the
position which the Court took in these cases. The Court itself recognized at an early date that the rule it had adopted was not sup166. See also Sheets v. Paine, 10 N.D. 103, 86 N.W. 1188 (1901); Paine v.
Willson, 146 Fed. 488 (8th Cir. 1906).
167. Power v. Bowdle, 3 N.D. 107, 54 N.W. 404 (1893).
168. Iowa & Dakota Land Co. v. Barnes Co., 6 N.D. 601, 72 N.W. 1019 (1897).
169. Sheets v. Paine, 10 N.D. 103, 86 N.W. 118 (1901). The correct description
was the "SE/4 of the 'SWa and the W% of the SW% of Section 19, Township 150,
Range 58. The township and range numbers were not listed in the assessment roll opposite
the name of the owner-an additional reason cited by the court for the invalidity of the
description.
170. Lee v. Crawford, 10 N.D. 482, 88 N.W. 97 (1901).
171. Nind v. Meyers & Beck, 15 N.D. 400, 109 N.W. 335 (1906).
172. Grand Forks County v. Frederick, 16 N.D. 118, 112 N.W. 839 (1907).
173. Wright v. Jones, 23 N.D. 191, 135 N.W. 120 (1912). The printed report
of this case in Volume 23 of the North Dakota Reports incorrectly gives the description
as "NW ," rather than as "N.W. 4." See Anderson v. Roberts, 71 N.D. 345, 1 N.W.2d
338 (1941).

Compare this case with the description held sufficient in Beggs

v. Paine,

15 N.D. 436, 109 N.W. 322 (1906), in which the description read "N.W. of Section
32, Township 130, Range 64, Acres 160," and the court said: "We have no hesitation
in holding that the description in this assessment roll is as perfectly intelligible to any
person of common understanding as it would be if written out in full. "N.W.' is the
abbreviation which means 'Northwest' wherever the English language is written. The
Northwest part of section 32, in the stated township and range, beloging to Philip
Dawson, and containing 160 acres, specifically and clearly identifies the land in question,
and could not reasonably be applied to any tract than the northwest quarter of the
section in question,"
174. Hackney v. Elliott, 23 N.D. 373, 137 N.W. 433 (1912).
715. Farmers Security Bank v. Martin, 29 N.D. 269, 150 N.W. 572 (1915).
176. State Finance Co. v. iMulberger, 16 N.D. 214, 112 N.W. 986 (1907).
177. Paine v. Willson, 146 Fed. 488 (8th Cir. 1906). See also Paine v. Germantown Trust Co., 136 Fed. 527 (8th Cir. 1904).
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portable, for in Beggs v. Paine,' upholding a description no more
definite than many of those cited above, it declared that it was not
disposed to extend the rule of the Larabee case beyond its precise
facts. Six years, later, however, reluctance to overturn precedent
apparently got the better of it; in Wright v. Jones 1 9 it described the rule as one of property and stated that the Court
had followed it too long to repudiate it, though it noted what it
termed the "severe criticism" to which these holdings had been
subjected.
In 1915, the North Dakota Legislature took a hand in the problem. As early as 1890, statutes had been enacted providing that
in describing land in proceedings relative to assessment, it was
sufficient to use "initial letters, abbreviations and figures to designate the township, range, sections, or parts of sections, and also
the number of lots and blocks." I"" This was deemed sufficient to
validate the description found in the early cases,"" but the legislature amended the law in 1915 to deal with the problems of description which had arisen in the cases, the statute providing specifically that "it is hereby intended to abrogate as to all further taxation proceedings the rule of construction arising from the early and
other decisions of the Supreme Court of this state under which
such descriptions in taxation proceedings as N.E.4 of a designated
section are held to be indefinite and void for taxation purposes." 182
The statute appeared in this form in the 1925 Supplement to the
North Dakota Compiled Laws of 1913,182 but in the Revised Code
of 1943 was omitted, apparently without the intention of repealing
it.184
In its later discussions of the rule of Power v. Larabee, the Court
has tended to take a far more realistic view. In Anderson v. Roberts,1 8' a modern decision, the court clearly indicated its intention
to give the precedents regarding misdescriptions a closely restricted
interpretation. The precision used to describe land in tax sale
proceedings, however, continues to be important; in Star v. Nor178. 15 N.D. 436, 109 N.W. 322 (1906).
179. 23 N.D. 191, 135 N.W. 1120 (1912).
180. N.D. Rev. Code §1281 (1899).
181. A discussion of the statute is found in Farmers' Security Bank v. Martin, 29
N.D. 269, 150 N.W. 572 (1915).
182. N.D. Sess. L. 1915, c. 1, §1.
183. N.D. Comp. Laws §2215 (Supp. 1925).
184. The statute is now N.D. Rev. Code §57-0202 (1943). The report of the
Code Revision Committee which prepared the 1943 revision of the code states that as it
appears in the code at present, the statute has been "revised in form only for clarity
and convenience." 22 Report of the Code Revision Committee §57-0202.
185. 71 N.D. 345, 1 N.W.2d 338 (1941). See also Twedt v. Hanson, 58 N.D.
571, 226 N.W. 615 (1929).
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steby,8 0 decided in 1948, the Court struck down a notice of the
expiration of the period of redemption because the notice contained
an invalid description.
On principle, it would seem that the rule which ought to be
applied is that of the North Dakota Revised Code: "No assessment
or tax based thereon shall be held invalid if it is possible to determine definitely what property was assessed, the valuation fixed
by the assessor, and the rate or amount of the tax levied, nor shall
it be held invalid for any defect in form, if the person or property
assessed in fact is subject to taxation, unless it shall appear that
such irregularity resulted to the prejudice of the party objecting." 18T
2. Failureto Verify Assessment Roll
The rule originally enunciated by the Court was that a failure to
verify the assessment roll invalidated all subsequent proceedings,
and that no valid tax could be levied on the property involved and
no sale of the land for such taxes was valid.' 88 In subsequent decisions this view has been abandoned. State Finance Co. v.
Mather.1'8 held this defect immaterial unless objection was made
prior to the sale and this view was reaffirmed in 1941.19°
3. Assessment of Two Tracts as One
The Court has held consistently that where two separate tracts
of land are assessed and sold together, the sale is void despite the
fact that the two tracts may have been owned by the same person.' 9' In State Finance Co. v. Bowdle,92 a good illustrative case,
a quarter section of land was involved. The north half of the quarter section was owned by one Ludlow and the south half was owned
by Ludlow and Beck as tenants in common. It was held that the
assessment of the two tracts as one invalidated the assessment and
the subsequent tax sale, since the statutes provided that a "tract"
of land, for assessment purposes, consisted of "any contiguous quan186. 75 N.D. 563, 30 N.W.2d 718 (1948).
187. N.D. Rev. Code §57-4514 (1943). But this section also provides that a tax
may be held invalid if it appears that "'the description of the property intended to be
assessed . . . cannot be definitely ascertained from the assessment roll which is the basis
of such tax." Apparently the rule that the description cannot be suppiemented by oral
testimony is still the law of this state.
188. Lee v. Crawford, 10 N.D. 482, 88 N.W. 97 (1901); Eaton v. Bennett, 10
N.D. 346, 87 N.W. 188 (1901); Power v. Kitching, 10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W. 737 (1901).
189. 15 N.D. 386, 109 N.W. 350 (1906).
190. Anderson v. Roberts, 71 N.D. 345, 1 N.W.2d 338 (1941). Cf. Graham v.
Mutual Realty Co., 22 N.D. 423, 134 N.W. 43 (1911).
191. Moore v. Beslei, 39 N.D. 243, 167 N.W. 218 (1918); Griffin v. Denison
Land Co., 18 N.D. 246, 119 N.W. 1041 (1908); State Finance Co. v. Beck, 15 N.D.
374, 109 N.W. 357 (1906); Roberts v. First National Bank of Fargo, 8 N.D. 504, 79
N.W. 1049 (1899); O'Neil v. Tyler, 3 N.D. 47, 53 N.W. 434 (1892).
192. 16 N.D. 193, 112 N.W. 76 (1907).
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tity of land in the possession, owned by, or recorded as the property
of, the same claimant, person, or company," 193 and such an assessment accordingly violated the statutory requirements. A similar result is reached where the two tracts involved are non-contaguous, 94 or when adjoining lots in a town plat are assessed together and valued at a lump sum.1 95 This is clearly an instance
where the non-observance of a statutory mandate is considered
"jurisdictional" in character.
4. Requirement that Land be Listed in Owner's Name
The statutes provide that the assessment list "shall show the
name of the owner, if known to (the assessor), and if unknown
shall state that fact, the number of acres, and the lots and parts
of lots or blocks included in each description." 196 In several cases
it has been argued that a listing of property on the assessed roll
under the name of a person who was not really the owner invalidated the assessment. In decisions rendered under the territorial
laws this contention was upheld 197 for the reason that the territorial revenue laws were drafted on the in personam theory of
property taxation 198 and an assessment of the wrong person obviously created no liability so far as the true owner of the land
was concerned. When the in rem theory of real estate taxation was
adopted, however, the reason for this rule ended, since the tax
was thereafter levied not upon the person who owned the land
involved but upon the land itself. Quite logically, the court reversed itself and ruled in subsequent decisions that a failure to
assess land in the name of the true owner or owners did not invalidate the tax.1 9' The statutory requirement was treated as directory and not mandatory. This appears to be the present rule.
5. Errors in Assessing Generally
One of the most interesting attacks upon the validity of an assessment was made in Shuttuck v Smith, 0 in which the validity
of all taxes levied in the city of Fargo from 1890 to 1893 was ques193. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0201 (1943).
194. Moore v. Besler, 39 N.D. 243, 167 N.W. 218 (1918); Griffin v. Denison
Land Co., 19 N.D. 246, 119 N.W. 1041 (1908).
195.- Roberts v. First National Bank of Fargo, 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1948 (1899);
O'Neil v. Tyler, 3 N.D. 47, 53 N.W. 434 (1892).
196. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0231 (1943).
197. Sweigle v. Gates, 9 N.D. 538, 84 N.W. 481 (1900); Roberts v. First National
Bank of Fargo, 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1048 (1899).
198. See the discussion of the character of the interest created by a tax deed,
supra pp. 236 Et Seq.
199. Sykes v. Beck, 12 N.D. 242, 96 N.W. 844 (1903); Hertzler v. Freeman,
12 N.D. 187, 96 N.W. 294 (1903).
200. 6 N.D. 56, 69 N.W.5 (1896).
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tioned on the ground that the taxes for which the plaintiff's property was sold were higher than they should have been because the
assessors undervalued other property in the same taxing jurisdiction. The errors claimed were that a hotel worth at least $100,000
was valued at less than $20,000; a property known as the "Bishop
Shanley Property" was assessed at less than 20 per cent of its worth;
a tract of land valued by witnesses at $75,000 belonging to a railroad was entirely omitted from the assessment roll; the entire right
of way of a railroad running through the city was not assessed, although buildings which stood on it were properly assessed; during
the years in question the state board of equalization assessed the
franchise, roadway, roadbed rails and rolling stock of the company at $2,500 per mile, which was allegedly one-eighth the reproduction cost; and the county farm lands were assessed at onehalf their value.
Despite the formidable nature of these errors, the Court held the
assessment valid. Among other things, it said:
The law requires the assessor to assess all property not by law
exempt from taxation, and to assess it at its actual value. Necessarily in this process, two things are left to the judgment of the
assessor: He must say primarily what is the actual value of the
property. To do this with any approach to accuracy requires
broad knowledge, extended experience, and excellent judgment. He must also say whether or not any given piece of
property belongs to any of the classes which are by law exempt.
Simple as this may appear, it is often a difficult and delicate
task. . . . But the duty of deciding these matters must be
lodged somewhere, and the legislature has seen proper to lodge
it primarily with the assessor. And in deciding these matters
the assessor acts as a judicial officer. This being true, and the
determinations of the assessor being in the nature of judgments, it is fundamental that errors and mistakes of judgment
while acting within his jurisdiction do not invalidate the assessment."o'
Similarly, it was held in Flath v. Elefson 202 that the valuation
of land could not be proven to have been excessive by showing
that the county which purchased the land at tax sale later sold it
to. a private purchaser at a price lower than the valuation for tax
purposes. It was said in that case that the valuation methods used
in fixing the sale price were distinct from those used in fixing the
tax load. One did not control the other.
201.
202.

Id. at 61-62, 69 N.W. at 7.
73 N.D. 746, 19 N.W.2d 571 (1945).
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C.

EQUALIZATION

OF ASSESSMENTS

The North Dakota Court has ruled specifically that a taxpayer
is entitled to a hearing upon the correctness of the valuation which
has been placed upon his property, and that the imposition of a
tax based upon a valuation without a hearing amounts to a taking
of property without due process of law. 20 3 From a constitutional
standpoint, however, the precise point in the tax proceedings at
which a hearing is granted is immaterial. "If at any period in -the
tax proceeding, or in the course of the judicial proceeding instituted to enforce the tax, the right to demonstrate that the tax
against the land is excessive is granted by statute, that protection
which the constitution guarantees is fully enjoyed by the citizen." 204

Customarily the right to a hearing is granted at the meetings of
the various boards of equalization.211 Does the fact that no meeting of the appropriate board of equalization took place at the time
specified by statute invalidate a sale of land for the delinquent
taxes of that particular year? Since notice of the hearing is supplied
only by the statutes prescribing the dates when the board will be
in session, the question received an affirmative answer in Power
v. Larabee,2Q6 decided in 1891. It received a negative answer in
Wells County v. McHenry,2 "0 7 decided seven years later. The two
cases, however, are not inconsistent. Power v. Larabee was decided
on the basis of a statute concerning tax sales substantially similar
to the system now in force, while Wells County v. McHenry involved a tax sale under the so-called "Woods Law," 201o which has
since been repealed. The distinguishing feature of "Woods Law"
procedure was that it involved a rendition by the district courts of
judgment for the amount of delinquent taxes, the sale of land for
non-payment of these taxes being treated as a sale of land to satisfy
the judgment. It was pointed out in Wells County v. McHenry
203. State ex rel. Miller v. Leech, 33 N.D. 513, 157 N.W. 492 (1916); Pickton
v. City of Fargo, 10 N.D. 469, 88 N.W. 90 (1901); Power v. Larabee, 2 N.D. 141, 49
N.W.

724

(1891);

Montana-Dakota

Power

Co.

v.

Weeks,

8

F.

Supp.

955,

938

(D. N.D. 1934).
204. Wells County v. MeHenry, 7 N.D. 246, 257, 74 N.W. 241, 245 (1898).
205. The statutory provisions dealing with this subject may be found in Chapters
57-09 (townships), 57-10 (villages), 57-11 (cities), 57-12 (counties) and 57-13 (state
board of equalization) of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943.
206. 2 N.D. 141, 49 N.W. 724 (1891).
207.
7 N.D. 246, 74 N.W. 241 (1898).
208. N.D. Sess. L. 1897, c. 67. Cases which are explanatory of the background,
operation and effect of this abortive attempt to reinforce the status of tax sales by adding
to them the sanction of judicial action are Purcell & Divet v. Farm Land Co., 13 N.D.
327, 100 N.W. 700 (1904); Darling & Angell v. Purcell, 13 N.D. 288, 100 N.W. 726
(1904); Emmons County v. Lands of First National Bank of Bismarck, 9 N.D. 583,
84 N.W. 379 (1900); Emmons County v. Thompson, 9 N.D. 598, 84 N.W. 385 (1900).
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that the taxpayer has a right to protest the valuation of his property
in Woods Law proceedings at the hearing in court, and this was
regarded as satisfying the constitutional requirement. Power v.
Larabee was distinguished because of the difference in the underlying statutes, the Court expressly stating that it did not wish to
qualify anything decided in that case.
The rule originally laid down in the Larabee case was that the
omission of the county board of equalization to meet at the time
and place designated by law operated to invalidate a subsequent
tax sale without proof of any actual injury to the taxpayer, since
it was said that the Court would presume an injury on grounds of
public policy.2e 9 It seems doubtful that proof of such an omission
without accompanying proof of actual prejudice would be considered sufficient at present. 210 And it is clear that errors which occur
in the course of equalization proceedings, as distinguished from a
failure to equalize taxes at all, are not sufficient to invalidate a
tax sale. Thus, it has been held that where a board of equalization
meets on the day specified by law and then adjourns the session
from day to day, some of the adjournments being by less than a
2 11
quorum of the board, equalizations thereafter made are valid.
A failure of the assessor to deliver the assessment roll to the auditor
on the day required by law will not invalidate the equalization
proceedings if the roll is in fact received by the board of equalization while it is still in session.2 1 2 Where the board of county commissioners sits as a board of equalization and keeps the record
of equalization actions in a separate book instead of as a part of
the records of the board of county commissioners, the equalization
is valid.2 13 And even though the record of the board of equalization
is neither signed nor certified, failure to object to the defect prior
to tax sale results in a loss of the right to object thereafter. 2 14 The
principle underlying this latter holding would appear to be logically
applicable to virtually any defect in the proceedings.
209. Power v. Larabee, supra, syll. 2. See also Pickton v. City of Fargo, 10 N.D.
469, 88 N.W. 90 (1901), in which it was said: 'No opportunity was ever . . . given
for a hearing before the paving committee or the council. It is scarcely necessary to
say that the rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that a tax upon real estate which .s
attempted to be assessed without permitting the taxpayer to be heard before the legally
designated tribunal is a void tax." Cf. Farrington v. New England Investment Co., 1
N.D. 102, 45 N.W. 191 (1890).
210. "No assessment 6r tax based thereon shall be held invalid . ..
unless it
shall appear that such irregularity resulted to the prejudice of the party objecting..
"
N.D. Rev. Code §57-4514 (1943). This section was enacted in 1903, after the decision
in Power v. Larabee. N.D. Sess. L. 1903, c. 166, §1.
211. O'Neil v. Tyler, 3 N.D. 47, 53 N.W. 434 (1892).
212. O'Neil v. Tyler, supra note 211.
213. Fisher v. Betts & Smith, 12 N.D. 197, 96 N.W. 132 (1903).
214. Anderson v. Roberts, 71 N.D. 345, 1 N.W.2d 338 (1941).
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D.

TAX LEVIES

The assessment of a tract of land for tax purposes should not be
confused with the process of making a levy of taxes upon it. An
assessment, as the preceding discussion has indicated, consists primarily of a valuation of property for tax purposes-a quasi- judicial
function involving the exercise of the assessor's judgment and skill.
The levy of a tax, on the other hand, is an entirely separate portion
of the taxing operation. It consists of a determination, by the appropriate taxing authorities, of the amount of money to be raised
by taxation during a given fiscal year.2 15 Essentially this is a legislative act, the performance of which is delegated by the legislature
to the various boards authorized to make tax levies.216
It is the making of a tax levy, in conjunction with the assessment,
which ordinarily determines the tax burden which a specific piece
of real property must bear. To assume a simplified case, suppose
that within County X is property worth $10,000,000 and that the
Board of County Commissioners decides upon a tax levy of $50,000
to meet expenses for the coming year. It is obvious that the county
tax rate upon any given piece of property is thereby automatically
set at .005 mills per dollar, since the total value of the assessed
property within the county ($10,000,000) divided into the tax levy
($50,000) yields that figure..217 It follows that if a resident of
County X owns property value at $10,000 the county tax which will
be imposed upon the property will be $50, since $10,000 x.005=$50.
Of course, the amount of this tax may be varied by an adjustment
of the assessment in the equalization process.
It is possible, as Blackwell points out, to make a levy of taxes in
two ways. "Sometimes it is voted to raise a certain amount by a
tax evenly distributed over property of a given kind, or over all
property in proportion to its value, and then when the assessors
have made a list of the property in the district taxed, and of its
value, the total value and the total tax easily give the rate by which
to calculate the tax on any piece of property whose value is known.
Sometimes the valuation is made before the levy and the body making the levy itself decides upon the percentage of taxation which
215. Blackwell, Tax Titles §193 (5th ed. 1889);
(4th ed. 1924).
216. 3 Cooley, Taxation §1012 (4th ed. 1924).
217.

low.

3 Cooley,

Taxation

§1012

This, of course, is an illustrative case only, and the tax rate given is extremely

The present tax laws limit state tax levies to four mills, exclusive of interest on

the public debt. N.D. Rev. Code §57-1503 (1943).

County tax levies are limited to 11

mills, with certain specified exceptions. N.D. Rev. Code §57-1506 (1943).
The
statutory regulations governing the size of such levies are set forth in Chapter 57-15
of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943.
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will be necessary to raise the amount required; then the levy takes
the form of an order to assess taxable property at a certain rate
named." 218 The former of these two methods is customarily called
a levy by specific amount; the latter is known as a levy by percentage.
The statutes provide that in this state all levies of taxes must be
by specific amounts..2 19 The consequences to a tax sale of a failure
to obey the statutory mandate are graphically illustrated by Dever
v. Cornwell, 220 in which the county board of commissioners made a
tax levy by percentages as follows: "For county general fund, 6
mills; for county sinking fund, 5/10 mills; for county road and
bridge 5/10 mills,-total 7 mills." 221 The court held that such a
levy of taxes was invalid, that the county treasurer accordingly
lacked jurisdiction to sell land on which such taxes were laid, and
that a tax sale and a tax deed arising out of the sale were void.
It was pointed out that the assessed value of the land within the
county was subject to revision by the State Board of Equalization,
222
and accordingly such a levy of taxes was uncertain in amount..
It has been held, however, that in the case of a state levy of taxes
the levy is not invalidated if made in percentages or mills rather
than in a specific amount, since the decision of the State Board of
Equalization on the valuation of property is final and a levy of
tax by percentages can therefore be easily translated into a levy
of a specific amount. In such a case, the maxim that that is certain which can be made certain applies, the provision of the statute
And similarly it has been held
being considered directory only.223
failed to draw up a
commissioners
that the fact that the county
budget before making a levy of taxes was a minor defect, cured
by the failure of the landowner involved to object prior to the tax
sale."24 Nor is it possible to attack a levy of taxes after a tax sale
has taken place on the ground that the amount levied was in excess
of the amount permitted by law.225 In short, under present rulings
218. Blackwell, Tax Titles §193 (5th ed. 1889).
219. "With the exception of special assessment taxes and such general taxes as
may be definitely fixed by law, all state, county, city, village, township, school district
and park district taxes shall be levied or voted in specific amounts of money." N.D. Rev.
Code §57-1501 (1943). See also N.D. Rev. Code §11-2305 (1943).
220. 10 N.D. 123, 86 N.W. 227 (1901).
221. Id. at 127, 86 N.W. at 229.
222. Accord, Fisher v. Betts & Smith, 12 N.D. 197, 96 N.W. 132 (1903); Wells
County v. McHenry, 7 N.D. 246, 74 N.W. 241 (1890).
223. Sykes v. Beck, 12 N.D. 242, 96 N.W. 844 (1903).
224. Munroe v. Donovan, 31 N.D. 228, 153 N.W. 461 (1915), app. dismissed,
See also Anderson v. Roberts, 71 N.D. 345, 1 N.W.2d
245 U.S. 679 (1917).
338 (1941).
225. Twedt v. Hanson, 58 N.D. 571, 226 N.W. 615 (1929).
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attacks upon tax sales on the ground that there was not a valid
law of taxes seem destined to fail unless based upon either a total
absence of any levy,2e or a levy by percentages-which in the
contemplation of the Court seems to amount to the same thing. It
seems difficult to see why the rule that a levy by percentage is a
jurisdictional defect should remain the law, however. Logically,
such a defect should be cured by failure to object to it before
the sale.27
(To Be Continued)

226. See O'Neil v. Tyler, 2 N.D. 47, 53 N.W. 434 (1892), in which the city
council of Fargo levied a tax, but the evidence failed to show that the mayor'participated
in the action. The city charter provided that the "mayor and council" should levy the
annual city taxes. It was held there was no valid levy and a tax levy based on failure to
pay such taxes was invalidated. Moreover, it was held that the ordinance under which
the council operated was void because the yeas and nays of the council when it was
adopted were not recorded. See on this latter point Pickton v. City of Fargo, 10 N.D.
469, 88 N.W. 90 (1901).
227. The court used language which would support such a view in Fish v. France,
71 N.D. 499, 2 N.W.2d 537 (1942).

